The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning, & Love
The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning, & Love
by Susan Wolf,
Oxford University Press, 2015, 260pp.
Reviewed by Morris Murray, Jr.
The ethical essays embedded in this volume fall within the rather large field of philosophy, i.e., a study of various attempts, based on reason and reflective understanding, to see the world as a whole and the search for meaning those attempts pursue. Philosophy involves interpreting and understanding human beings and the world in which they function from the standpoints of (1) what is real (metaphysics), (2) what is knowledgeable (epistemology), (3) what is logical (correct and incorrect reasoning), (4)what is ethical (the ultimate good, conduct in terms of good and bad), (5) what is aesthetic (beauty), and (6) what is socio-political (angles as to how societal norms, activities and customs influence politics and vice-versa). This broad and rather generalized orientation (i.e., the essence of philosophy) seeks to accomplish that feat by using data from every available source. As just noted, one of the specific areas of philosophical study or inquiry is that of ethics (that branch of philosophy concerned with moral conduct, goodness, duty and development). The present volume represents efforts in that regard.
Although one not familiar with the nature of philosophical inquiry may find this volume somewhat challenging, perplexing and perhaps even circular or overlapping, the more philo-sophically informed reader will welcome these ideations with stimulating reflection, apprecia- tion and appropriate integration for a well-ordered life. After all, the varying perspectives in Wolf’s mix on moral and non-moral (such as, humor, athleticism, musical abilities) values un- avoidably impact how we view the meaningfulness of life, love and duty (the fourfold major themes or divisions within this book).
The first theme or division (MORAL AND NONMORAL VALUES) opens with her first writing (“Moral Saints”) [ch. 2] in which she objects to deontological (dutifulness/moral obligations) ethics on the grounds that sainthood (“always as morally good as possible”) makes one avoid some desirable activities because they are in conflict with the domination of moral analysis and adherence. Moral sainthood, therefore, is undesirable, impractical and dull. It also creates the potential for a rational saint who has selfish desires but does not act on them, or a loving saint who is altruistic.
In chapter 3, she objects to the equality of all people in terms of well-being and respect and advocates a moderate impartiality on the basis of friendship and love. In chapter 4, she notes that everyone has personal points of view of equal significance. If there were no moral deliberations, people would act rationally anyway. After all, non-moral values do not fit into a single viewpoint. In chapter 5, she votes against the welfare theory of value (“good for someone or something”) on the grounds that objective goodness is too vague, and how to conceptualize welfare is contradictory or puzzling. She maintains that things we love can be of value even if we or others do not benefit from them. The use of examples to support her pivotal points is masterful.
The second theme or division (MEANING IN LIFE) opens with chapter 6 in which she squabbles over whether or not life in general or just individual lives are meaningful. To value something besides yourself is imperative, she insists, since each person is simply a speck in a vast universe. So, pursue active involvement in something with positive values, even if they are not moral. Why does she so differentiate as if there are no recognizable interactions? Strange. Self-interest (“the advancement of one’s own good with meaningful activity for the good life”) is confronted in chapter 7: Some meaningful activity may have worthiness within itself, even to the extent that one’s own self-interest is decentralized. Her vague process of construction and decon-struction in this regard seems necessarily bent by excessive analysis and resulting paralysis. In chapter 8, her wrestling, and sometimes seemingly ambivalent wandering, with Williams’s impartial morality (meaningless is lifelessness, even with morality itself) is conclusively inconclusive: In other words, the preservation of morality for the sake of meaningfulness is compromised by a dichotomy between subjective and objective aspects of meaningfulness.
The third theme (LOVE) is explored in chapter 9 by taking another cue from Williams: His di-lemma of saving only one of two lives (that of his wife and not that of another) is defended on the basis that a normally moral person cannot be thinking about what is morally justifiable all the time. In other words, some situations fall outside the boundaries of moral justification. In chapter 10, by taking her cue from Murdoch’s The Philadelphia Story (“The best love is an attentive love” which sees reality and loves without hesitation or reservation), she transforms its moral-less basis for viewing virtue into one embracing knowledge and attentive care for the one who is loved. In this way, “love of reality is central to morality” (p. 177). The importance she places upon love (chapter 11) is phenomenal. It stems from her self-confessed “reactive and critical personality” (p. 181) in her quest for life’s core value which she maintains is love – love which gives a unique motivational reason to live as a force for good to others apart from any self-interests. This is a refreshingly attractive perspective in which and from which “love makes the world go round.” This is the most worthwhile chapter in the book. Many Christian parallels could have been noted here.
The fourth theme (THE CONCEPT OF DUTY) is examined in chapter 12 from the standpoint that morality may be a burden. After all, all things that are valuable and desirable are not equally moral when it comes to dutifulness. She suggests finding a balance between taking duty “too seriously” or “too lightly” for the sake of “greater moral importance” (p. 214). In chapter 13, practical deliberations about morality should be based on how the core of morality is understood. Large scale cooperativeness and egalitarianism could together determine appropriate rules.
Chapter 14 highlights how moral obligations arise from social requirements, with various groups having different requirements, thus complicating the model. She advocates the social command theory which opens the door for moral obligations which are acceptable to those who believe in God and those who do not. Again, finding a balance between moral obligations and social commands must be more than theoretical. However, in my opinion, the ever-increasing multi-culturalism that is taking place within this nation indicates that social requirements may forever be difficult to isolate on a scale large enough to accommodate her orientation.
If you prefer concrete thinking with specific answers, definitive pronouncements, and dogmatic conclusions, you should probably stay miles away from this book – with the exception of chapter 11 which, again, is saturated with Christian aspects of love (although no scriptural references are pinpointed). On the other hand, if you prefer to seek rather than find (a charge often brought against philosophers); if analysis, probing the intricacies of moral choices from a wide range of value-ideations and intrigue are for you, then look no further than The Variety of Values by Susan Wolf.
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